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ABSTRACT
This paper describes the ARMS system which enables secure and
adaptive rich media streaming to a large-scale, heterogeneous client
population. The secure streaming algorithms ensure end-to-end se-
curity while the content is adapted and streamed via intermediate,
potentially untrusted servers. ARMS streaming is completely stan-
dards compliant and to our knowledge is the first such end-to-end
MPEG-4-based system.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.3.4 [Information Storage and Retrieval]: Systems and Soft-
ware—Distributed Systems
General Terms
Design, Security, Standardization
Keywords
Adaptive, Encrypted, MPEG-4, video server,streaming, Scalability
1. INTRODUCTION
Many enterprises use streaming video to convey news clips or
corporate communications to their employees or clients. However,
since the networks are based on packet-switching technology which
is designed for data communication, achieving efficient distribution
of streaming video and multimedia to a wide heterogeneous user
population poses many technical challenges. Besides the standard
video-over-IP issues, enterprises have additional requirements due
to the need to control a shared infrastructure where business media
comes first. In addition to challenges in terms of video coding and
networking, one of the key requirements for enterprise streaming
is clearly posed in terms of security. The video distribution has
to be efficient and to adapt to the clients requirements, while at
the same time offering a high degree of security through proper
authentication, authorization and encryption techniques.
In this paper we describe the ARMS (Adaptive Rich Media Se-
cure) streaming architecture, with a focus on original extensions
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to the secure-streaming standards. The proposed extensions al-
low various adaptive multimedia streaming techniques over lossy
IP networks, to work in the secure domain. To our knowledge, this
is the first such end-to-end MPEG-4-based system, which is also
completely standards compliant. Specifically, ARMS addresses the
following requirements of an end-to-end enterprise media distribu-
tion solution – (i) adaptive, secure and standards-based streaming,
(ii) scalable broadcast using application-level or IP multicast, (iii)
archive and VoD streaming. The ARMS content-creation, encryp-
tion and streaming solutions are being implemented in IBM’s Con-
tent Manager VideoCharger [2] streaming server product.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the related work. Secure streaming algorithms along with adap-
tivity are described in Section 3. The architecture of the ARMS
system where the algorithms are implemented is described in Sec-
tion 4. Finally our plans for the future of this project are discussed
in Section 5.
2. RELATED WORK
Various coding strategies address the problem of serving het-
erogeneous clients with adaptive video quality. In Stream Repli-
cation [4], the source signal is encoded into multiple independent
streams, each suited to a set of client characteristics such as avail-
able rate, packet-loss characteristics, etc. In Layered Coding [6],
the video is encoded into multiple layers consisting of one base
layer and multiple enhancement layers. Each enhancement layer
provides progressive refinement of the signal. MPEG-2 and MPEG-
4 define spatial, temporal and SNR scalability modes. In Multiple
Description Coding [9], the video is encoded in two or more in-
dependently decodable layers. The decoded signal quality is pro-
portional to the number of layers decoded. Although MDC has
been shown to be a very promising choice for adaptive streaming
in lossy environments, the MPEG-4 standard does not support it.
Among these schemes, stream replication and layered coding are
standards compliant, although layered-coding is not in widespread
use. One of the reasons is that for a few targeted bit-rates (which is
commonly the case in enterprises), coding individual streams yields
better quality than multiple layers [5].
Several adaptive streaming techniques are also in use. The Stream
Switching mechanism works with stream replication and multiple
description coding where the encodings are independent. Depend-
ing on the client feedback about the observed packet losses or band-
width, the server streams the most suitable encoding to the client.
In order for the server to do this with minimal distortion due to
switching, various strategies have been proposed – SP-frames in
H.26L, insertion of periodic I-frames etc. Some solutions, based
on layered coding schemes, choose to add or drop layers [7, 12]
from the stream. When either the client or the server realizes that
the connection speed has changed, additional video layers are either
dropped or added to improve the reception quality. Another alterna-
tive is to add/drop whole streams such as video in favor of audio, at
the server, based on measurements or policy. On-the-fly Transcod-
ing [8, 14] has also been suggested where the server transcodes the
stream to address the changing network conditions. This method is
computationally expensive and may not be very scalable.
Various secure distribution schemes are also in use. Most use
the download model, where the content is encrypted at the source,
downloaded and decrypted by the client. This method prevents me-
dia from being streamed and adapted since the server cannot access
the encrypted media. Papers by Wee [11] describe a secure en-
coding system that is based on scalable encoders which allows for
adaptation while still in the secure domain. The technique however,
does not apply to non-scalable coding techniques and the encryp-
tion and packetization techniques are non-standard.
ARMS uses the stream-replication technique and adopts novel
enhancements such that only portions of the stream are multiply
encoded. This improves the achievable rate-distortion at the client
significantly, while still being network-efficient. The encryption
and adaptation techniques described in this paper work regardless
of whether the entire stream or only portions are multiply encoded.
Data is encrypted and packaged at the source such that the interme-
diate server can implement a simple and efficient stream-switching
algorithm, based on the measured bandwidth to the client. Since
the encryption uses a counter-based cipher (See Section 3), it is
loss-tolerant and is applicable to both scalable and non-scalabe en-
coding profiles of MPEG-4, such as layered encoding and MPEG-4
Fine Grained Scalabe (FGS) coding. This scheme may also be ap-
plicable to proprietary encoding methods as used by Microsoft or
RealNetworks.
3. SECURE STREAMING
This section gives a brief overview of the ISMA security stan-
dard [3] and details the enhancements made by us to enable adap-
tive streaming of secure content. This enables trustworthy distribu-
tion of content over potentially untrusted servers. ISMA stands for
Internet Streaming Media Alliance and is an industrial consortium,
of which IBM is one of the founding members.
3.1 ISMA Security Standard
Streaming media can be delivered as a file download, lossless
streaming over TCP, or potentially lossy streaming over UDP. Ad-
ditionally, the delivery of the protected content need not necessarily
be done via trusted intermediaries. Therefore, standardization bod-
ies like the Internet Streaming Media Alliance (ISMA) have opted
for an end-to-end security model. As shown in Figure 4, only the
content creator, the trusted Key Management System, and the client
are in the trusted domain. For untrusted intermediaries to be able
to distribute data, the formats standardized are such that sufficient
meta data is available at all stages so that delivery can be done with-
out needing access to the actual multimedia content. That is, the
encryption is done at the content rather than at the transport level,
making the protection transport-independent and therefore end-to-
end secure.
The ISMA Standard specifies streaming of multimedia over IP
networks using RTP over UDP. In such a system, there can be data
loss and the amount of data lost is typically unknown. To enable
resynchronization of the decryptor with the data under these condi-
tions, we use a stream cipher that allows random access. A stream
cipher has an index associated with each byte (or bit) of data. This
index is typically the position in the stream of bytes and can be
used to start decrypting a stream from that position. Examples of
such stream ciphers are SEAL [10] and a block cipher in Counter
Mode. Examples of a block cipher are DES [13] and its succes-
sor Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [1]. For an overview on
cryptography, see [13].
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Figure 1: Encryption of a stream of data consisting of 4 Access
Units.
For encryption and decryption of streams, we use the AES in
Counter Mode, where the counter value is 16 bytes (128 bits).
Given a 16, 24, or 32-byte encryption key, a counter value is input
into the AES cipher, which produces a 16-byte block. In Counter
Mode the data encryption is then performed by bitwise XOR-ing
the enciphered counter value with an equally sized data block. To
encrypt another 16-byte block of data, the counter is incremented
by 1, and the above steps are repeated. To encrypt a continuous
stream of multimedia Access Units (such as video frames), we keep
incrementing the counter each time we need more data to apply the
XOR to. This is shown in the Figure 1 for a stream of 4 Access
Units of sizes 70, 51, 27, and 8. The decryption process is identical
to the encryption process. The same enciphered counter values are
created, but is now XOR-ed with the cipher text to recreate the data.
In order to be able to address each data byte by itself, the counter
is extended with the 4-bit offset into the 16-byte block to form the
encryption index. Given this index, we can restart the decryption
at any given point and can therefore have random access into an
encrypted stream, and are able to resynchronize decryption after a
loss of (any unknown amount of) data.
To deal with data loss, every RTP packet includes the encryp-
tion index with the corresponding encrypted data. This index is in
the clear, which does not pose a security risk, and can be used to
resynchronize the decryption process in case of packet loss. Be-
cause the actual index can be quite large, typically only that part of
the index that is expected to change to bridge an expected amount
of packet loss is included in the RTP packet. For example, if only
the 24 least significant bits of the encryption index are included in
each RTP packet, then a loss-burst of  bytes can be tolerated. If
larger bursts of data loss are anticipated or it must be possible to at
any time join a broadcast that may run for example for a few hours,
then a longer encryption index should be included in RTP packets.
The standard allows for the inclusion of a full index (of 132 bits) in
any packet in the stream.
3.2 ARMS Adaptation on Encrypted Stream
In ARMS streaming, the media server receives multiple encoded
streams and streams a subset to each client depending on their
bandwidth characteristics. Besides, the server may switch among
streams dynamically depending on the observed bandwidth. Note
that the network conditions need not be the only condition the server
reacts to. External agents such as policy engines can also influence
this decision.
Putting together stream-switching and end-to-end security im-
poses some constraints on how the encryption index is chosen. As
a cryptographic constraint, the same index must never be used twice
for the same encryption key. That constraint can be overcome by
encrypting the alternate Access Units (streams) with different keys.
However, we must also take into account that we do not want to
send the complete index (e.g. the 132 bits) by relying on an index
that always increases minimally from packet to packet. Sending
a complete index would increase the overhead from a mere 16-24
bits to 132 bits per RTP data packet, which can be deemed unac-
ceptable, especially if packets are small. Hence the RTP payload
format for encrypted data carries a 16-24 bit index per packet. The
length of this index depends on the expected length of a packet-loss
burst.
In the ARMS case, we need to tackle the problem of encrypting
a multimedia stream that may have multiple Access Units for each
time slot. The problem is to select the encryption index for each
Access Unit such that the encryption index always increases, re-
gardless of which Access Unit the server selects for transmission.
There are two cases to deal with :
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Figure 2: Determination of the encryption index when the key
is different in each stream.
 Each stream has a different key : In the most common sit-
uation a different key is used for each alternate Access Unit
for any given time slot. At any given time slot i we shall de-
fine that a stream has N(i) Access Units (descriptions), the
encryption indexes of those being C(i,1) through C(i,N(i))
and the corresponding sizes being L(i,1) through L(i,N(i)),
in bytes. If we represent each Access Unit as a horizontal
bar with a size proportional to the length of that Access Unit,
the solution can be depicted as shown in Figure 2. Indexes of
all the access units at a time slot are equal and the indices at
time slot (i+1) is computed as :
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Figure 3: Determination of the encryption index when the key
is the same for all the streams.
 Each stream uses the same key : In case a single key is
used for all streams, then the same index can not be used
more than once and we have to increment the index from one
Access to the next. This is depicted in Figure 3, where again
the sizes of the horizontal bars correspond to the Access Unit
lengths. Here the index at time slot (i+1) is computed as
below :
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4. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section we describe how the secure streaming technique
is used in the end-to-end ARMS system. The main components of
the architecture are illustrated in Figure 4. The components con-
sist of the Broadcaster which is the source of encrypted content,
packaged for adaptation, the VideoStore to store the possibly mul-
tiply encoded content, the Streaming Server which uses a simple
and efficient stream-switching technique for adaptation, and finally
the playback Clients. The figure illustrates a simple configuration
with one instance of each of the main components. In large scale
deployments, the streaming servers can be networked for distribu-
tion and there can be multiple Broadcasters and VideoStores.
Broadcaster : The broadcaster passes raw audio and video input
through a bank of MPEG-4 encoders to produce encoded streams
in multiple resolutions. These are then passed through an encryp-
tion module which keeps all the necessary streaming headers in
the clear and only encrypts the content in secure containers. The
secured content will then be accessible only by end-clients with a
valid key. Finally the data is packetized for transport in the RTP
format. The particular payload format used depends on the media
type and whether the data is encrypted or not. For non-encrypted
data, the standard IETF payload formats are used. When the data is
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Figure 4: Architecture of a End-to-end Secure Streaming Sys-
tem.
encrypted, the ISMA ”DRM” payload format is used, which, at the
time of this writing, is under ISMA-member review. It is expected
to be published and presented to the IETF for consideration soon.
VideoStore : This component uses standard ISMA MPEG-4 hint-
ing to store the different stream resolutions under different hint-
tracks, each with metadata describing the stream characteristics
such as encoding rate, packet-loss sensitivity, etc. The encryption
module is then used to encrypt the content into secure containers.
Since such content is MPEG-4 compliant, it can be streamed by
any compliant streaming server. However, only servers with the
ARMS capability will be able to switch among tracks and adapt to
changing client conditions.
Streaming Server : The Streaming Server receives data either
from the broadcaster or from the videostore. The encryption of
the media data is transparent to the server since it only uses in-
formation in the hint-tracks or packet headers to stream the data.
Data is received from the broadcaster in the form of RTP packets
over one of many different transports – (i) multiplexed in one TCP
channel in the RTSP-interleave format, (ii) over multiple indepen-
dent UDP unicast channels or (iii) over multiple independent UDP
multicast channels. In each case, a unique channel number iden-
tifies packets belonging to a particular encoding. The server mea-
sures the available bandwidth to each of its clients and forwards
the most suitable channel to the client. For TCP-based client con-
nections, TCP-backpressure is used to estimate the available rate
and for RTP/UDP connections, RTCP feedback is used to estimate
the TCP-friendly rate. If the streamed bandwidth is well below the
rate requested by the client, then the server periodically attempts
to increase the bandwidth to the client by probing it with duplicate
packets.
Client : The client obtains the SDP describing the media and the
encryption keys from a Key Management system. The Videocharger
server is capable of streaming MPEG-4 to any standards compliant
client such as Apple QuickTime 6, Philips player, Cisco player and
the IBM player. Among these, at the time of this writing, only the
IBM player implements the ISMA decryption standard.
5. FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we described the ARMS system architecture with
a focus on the extensions to the ISMA security standard to enable
adaptative streaming of encrypted MPEG-4 content. The system
is designed to address the requirements of typical enterprise media
streaming systems. Although we have addressed many challenges
in building this system, there are many more problems yet to be
solved. We are investigating various optimizations in the coding
and streaming to improve the bandwidth utilization while minimiz-
ing the distortion experienced by the clients in wired and wireless
networks.
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